Cutting public school funding since 1976.
Fifty years of Ohio statutes against public schools, on a single page. The 1976 law that locked in operating revenue. The four Ohio Supreme Court rulings that held the funding system unconstitutional. The laws since that have widened the violation. And every bill currently in the legislature that will compress school revenue further.
Most of the discussion about why Ohio public schools are under financial pressure focuses on the wrong actor. School boards do not write Ohio's property-tax statutes. Treasurers do not set voucher amounts. Teachers do not freeze the Fair School Funding Plan. Those decisions are made in Columbus, by the General Assembly and the Governor, and the record of the last fifty years is not ambiguous: every major Ohio policy decision affecting public-school funding has reduced it, redirected it, or made it more expensive to maintain.
The state is not failing public schools by accident. It is failing them by statute, signed by governors, against the explicit instruction of the state's own Supreme Court. This page is a reference document on every law that has done that — and every bill currently in the legislature that will do it further.
Chart 01 · Interactive timeline
Hover or tap any dot to see what the legislature did, when, and what it did to public-school funding. Court rulings against the state appear below the line in green and sage; laws and bills that compressed school funding appear above the line in red and ochre.
-
1976 · SignedHB 920Property Tax Reduction FactorCreated automatic tax-rate rollbacks when property values rise. Locks operating-millage revenue in nominal dollars for districts above the 20-mill floor. Sycamore, with effective operating millage well above the floor, captures essentially zero inflation revenue from voted operating millage as a result.
-
1997–2002 · 4 RulingsDeRolph v. StateFunding system unconstitutionalThe Ohio Supreme Court ruled the state's school-funding system unconstitutional under Article VI §2 in DeRolph I (March 24, 1997), and reaffirmed it in II (2000), III (2001), and IV (2002). The court ordered the General Assembly to fix it. The legislature has spent the years since widening the violation rather than fixing it.
-
2005 · SignedHB 66Tangible Personal Property tax phase-out beginsThe state phases out the TPP business-equipment tax that local schools relied on, with a promise to reimburse districts for the loss. Subsequent biennial budgets phase out the reimbursements themselves through 2015.
-
2015 · Cliff ReachedTPP wind-downTPP reimbursements end — the promise is withdrawnThe state finishes phasing out reimbursements. Sycamore loses approximately $9 million per year permanently — about 12% of the operating budget. The 6.5-mill 2016 operating levy is passed almost entirely to fill that hole.
-
2021 · EnactedFair School Funding PlanFSFP — the compliance attemptThe legislature's first serious response to DeRolph. A bipartisan, six-year phase-in tied to actual cost-of-education inputs. Designed to bring Ohio's school-funding system into constitutional compliance for the first time since 1997. HB 96 (2025) abandons the phase-in.
-
2023 · SignedHB 33Universal EdChoice expansionRemoves income caps from EdChoice. Statewide voucher cost: $354M (FY22-23) → $1.095B (FY25). Recipients: 23,272 → over 100,000. Roughly 65,000 of the new vouchers in year one went to families already in private school (Policy Matters Ohio). Low-income share of recipients fell from 67% to 17% in one year.
-
June 24, 2025 · RulingColumbus City Schools v. StateEdChoice held unconstitutionalFranklin County Common Pleas Judge Jaiza Page rules that EdChoice violates the Ohio Constitution on multiple counts, including the same Article VI §2 clause that DeRolph found violated 28 years earlier. 300+ districts joined the Vouchers Hurt Ohio coalition. AG Yost has appealed.
-
June 30, 2025 · SignedHB 96FY26-27 budget freezes the FSFPAbandons the FSFP phase-in. Freezes base-cost inputs at outdated 2022 figures. Ohio public schools receive $2.86 billion less over FY26-27 than the FSFP would have provided (Policy Matters Ohio). Same bill simultaneously budgets ~$2.4B for vouchers.
-
December 2025 · SignedHB 335 / 309 / 186 / 124 / 129Five property-tax billsHB 335 ("Property Tax Relief NOW Act") caps inside-millage growth at 3-year inflation rate — cuts school revenue $621M-$763M over 3 years with state backfill of only $411M total over 2 years. HB 309 lets counties reduce levies for districts with reserves above 30%. HB 186 caps 20-mill-floor district revenue at inflation.
-
2026 · Pending5 active billsAll compressing public-school revenueHB 96 Item 66 (House overrode 61–28 on July 21, 2025; Senate pending) — would eliminate replacement and emergency school levies. HB 96 Item 65 — separately pending; would add emergency levies to the 20-mill-floor calc. SB 68 — new ESA voucher tier (~$8,242/student) for nonchartered religious schools. HB 11 (Backpack Bill) — universal ESA, championed by Speaker Huffman. HB 671 — Rep. Callender's bill to withhold state aid from the 330+ districts that sued the state. AxOHTax — citizen amendment to abolish all property tax (schools are the largest single recipient).
-
2027 · FutureAxOHTaxAbolish all real property taxesCitizen-initiated constitutional amendment. As of April 2026, organizers have ~305,000 of 413,487 required signatures (deadline July 1, 2026). Likely off the 2026 ballot. Organizers say they will refile for 2027. Statewide property-tax revenue is approximately $24 billion per year; schools are by far the largest single recipient. The amendment provides no replacement revenue.
DeRolph v. State — Ohio's school funding has been unconstitutional since 1997
Every other entry on this page sits inside a frame the Ohio Supreme Court drew thirty years ago. Without understanding DeRolph, none of what follows is fully visible. With DeRolph in mind, the legislative record reads as continuous, willful non-compliance with a court order.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the state's reliance on local property taxes to fund public schools created such severe disparities between districts that it violated Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution — the clause requiring the General Assembly to "secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state."
The case was filed on behalf of Nathan DeRolph, a student in the Northern Local School District in Perry County, and consolidated with similar plaintiffs from low-property-wealth districts across Ohio. The court found that the state had effectively delegated its constitutional responsibility to local property tax bases, producing per-pupil funding gaps that no level of local effort could close.
Between 1997 and 2002, the Ohio General Assembly produced a series of partial fixes — adjustments to the foundation formula, increased base-cost calculations, modest new revenue. The Ohio Supreme Court found each of them inadequate. DeRolph II (2000) ruled the state's response still failed constitutional muster. DeRolph III (2001) ruled the same. DeRolph IV (December 2002) was the court's fourth ruling that Ohio's school-funding system remained unconstitutional.
In 2003, after six years of pressure and four substantively identical holdings, the court withdrew jurisdiction and returned the matter to the General Assembly with an order to fix it. The court did not declare the system constitutional. It declared itself out of patience.
Article VI, Section 2 — "a thorough and efficient system of common schools."
The constitutional clause the General Assembly has been violating since 1997 reads, in full:
Two clauses are doing the work: the requirement that the General Assembly "secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools" — which DeRolph held the property-tax-based funding system fails — and the prohibition on giving any "religious or other sect" exclusive right to or control of school funds, which is one of the constitutional theories underlying the June 24, 2025 ruling that EdChoice violates the same article.
Every major Ohio law that has compressed public-school funding, in chronological order
Read as a record, the legislative history shows a consistent pattern: each successive intervention has reduced the public-school funding base, redirected its dollars to other purposes, or constrained the local revenue tools districts use to compensate. Some of these laws predate DeRolph. The ones that came after DeRolph were enacted in the explicit knowledge that the underlying system had been declared unconstitutional.
HB 920 created Ohio's "tax reduction factor": when property values rise during a triennial reappraisal, voted operating millage is automatically rolled back so that the dollar revenue from that levy stays approximately flat. The mechanism stops applying once a district falls to the 20-mill floor — at which point inflation revenue is captured.
The practical effect: roughly 420 of Ohio's 611 school districts are at the 20-mill floor and capture inflation; the remaining suburban districts above the floor capture essentially zero inflation revenue from voted operating millage. Sycamore Community Schools sits well above the floor, which means the 6.5-mill operating levy voters approved in 2016 generates almost the same dollar revenue today as it did when first collected.
This statute is the single biggest reason Sycamore — and other suburban districts that voters have reliably supported — face structural revenue compression that property-poor districts at the floor do not. It is also the reason a district must return to voters for new operating millage every several years simply to keep pace with cost-of-living inflation.
For decades, Ohio collected a Tangible Personal Property tax on business equipment and inventory, and distributed the revenue to local school districts as part of their operating funding. In 2005, HB 66 phased out the TPP tax and committed the state to reimburse districts for the loss. Subsequent biennial budgets — from 2009 onward — phased out the reimbursement payments themselves.
By 2015, the reimbursements had ended entirely. Sycamore's specific permanent revenue loss was approximately $9 million per year — about 12% of the district's then-budget. The 6.5-mill 2016 operating levy was passed almost entirely to fill that hole.
HB 33 removed the income-eligibility cap from Ohio's EdChoice Expansion voucher program. Beginning in school year 2023–24, any Ohio student became eligible for full or prorated voucher amounts — $6,166 K–8 and $8,408 high school at full scholarship, with prorated amounts for higher-income families.
The expansion's effect on enrollment was immediate and large. EdChoice Expansion recipients went from 23,272 in 2022–23 to 82,946 in 2023–24 to roughly 100,941 in 2024–25. Statewide voucher spending across all five Ohio voucher programs went from roughly $354 million in FY22–23 to over $1.095 billion in FY25 — a tripling in two years.
Critical detail: in 2023–24, Ohio issued roughly 70,000 new EdChoice Expansion vouchers, but private-school enrollment grew by fewer than 3,000 students. Policy Matters Ohio's analysis estimates roughly 65,000 of those new vouchers went to families already in private school. The share of voucher recipients from low-income families dropped from 67% to 17% in a single year. The program is now overwhelmingly a state subsidy to wealthier families who had already opted out of public education.
The Fair School Funding Plan was Ohio's most ambitious school-funding overhaul in a generation — designed by a bipartisan committee in 2021 in response to DeRolph and intended to phase in over six years on up-to-date base-cost inputs that adjusted for actual educational costs. It was, in effect, the legislature's first serious attempt at constitutional compliance with DeRolph.
HB 96 abandoned the phase-in. Base-cost inputs were frozen at outdated 2022 figures — figures that predate the post-pandemic inflation surge that has hit every school cost line. Most districts were placed on a guarantee at FY21 nominal levels, meaning state foundation aid is essentially flat in nominal dollars and shrinking in real terms.
Policy Matters Ohio's post-enactment estimate: Ohio public schools will receive $2.86 billion less over the FY26–27 biennium than the FSFP would have provided. The same bill simultaneously increased voucher spending by 20%.
In December 2025, six months after signing HB 96, Gov. DeWine signed a five-bill property-tax package designed to address taxpayer complaints about rising property-tax bills. The package was framed publicly as "property tax relief." Its actual effect on school operating revenue was a multi-hundred-million-dollar cut.
HB 335 ("Property Tax Relief NOW Act," sponsored by Reps. Dave Thomas, R-Jefferson, and Bill Roemer, R-Richfield) caps inside-millage growth at the three-year inflation rate. As enacted, the bill cuts school revenue an estimated $621M–$763M over three years per Legislative Service Commission analysis. State backfill: $306M year one, $105M year two — partial and temporary.
HB 309 empowers county budget commissions to reduce school levies when a district's unencumbered fund balance is judged "excessive" relative to projected expenses — a provision that targets the exact reserve-building behavior Sycamore practiced for fifteen years to avoid coming back to the ballot. HB 186 caps revenue growth at inflation for districts at the 20-mill floor (the roughly 400 districts where most operating revenue actually comes from local sources). HB 124 and HB 129 add additional restrictions to the levy and tax-rate framework.
The Ohio School Boards Association called HB 335 a bill that "jeopardizes educational opportunities for Ohio's 1.7 million public school students."
The lottery doesn't fund schools. It lets the General Assembly fund them less.
One reasonable objection to everything documented above is that public schools have a major dedicated revenue source the rest of state government doesn't: the Ohio Lottery. Voters approved it by constitutional amendment in 1973. Voters dedicated its profits exclusively to education by a second amendment in 1987. The lottery transferred $1.448 billion to the Lottery Profits Education Fund in FY25 alone, and cumulative transfers since 1974 exceed $34 billion. So how can Ohio possibly be cutting public school funding when there's a billion and a half a year flowing in from a dedicated education revenue stream?
The answer is documented by the Ohio Legislative Service Commission itself. Lottery dollars don't add to public-school funding. They substitute for general-fund spending the legislature would otherwise have to make. Every dollar the lottery contributes is a dollar the General Assembly doesn't have to allocate from the General Revenue Fund — and increasingly, what the GRF would have funded has been cut elsewhere.
The lottery is a relatively small share of K–12 spending. The much larger General Revenue Fund share is what the legislature actually controls — and has progressively constrained.
The Ohio Legislative Service Commission's August 2024 brief documents the underlying arithmetic. Lottery profits, the LSC writes, "are combined with the GRF to support primary and secondary education in Ohio" and "have always been a relatively small percentage of total" state spending on K–12. The share peaked at 16.9% in FY 1991, fell to a low of 7.6% in FY 2007, and was 11.5% in FY 2024. The remaining ~88% comes from the General Revenue Fund.
This is the structural reason public-school advocates have argued for decades that the lottery functions as a substitute for — not an addition to — general-fund education spending. The General Assembly appropriates education funding through the biennial budget. Those appropriations don't automatically rise when lottery profits rise; instead, lottery profits become part of the funding mix that meets the legislature's appropriation. An additional dollar of lottery revenue therefore doesn't increase total school spending by a dollar — it reduces the GRF share required to fund the same total. And the GRF, the larger source, has been progressively constrained over twenty years through major business tax reductions.
Where the freed-up general-fund money has gone — major Ohio business tax cuts
The lottery's substitution dynamic is half the story. The other half is what Ohio has done with its General Revenue Fund over the same period. Beginning in 2005, the General Assembly enacted a series of major business tax cuts that have collectively eroded billions from the fund that pays for everything the lottery doesn't — including the 88–90% of K–12 funding the lottery doesn't cover.
HB 66 phased out two of Ohio's primary business taxes: the Corporate Franchise Tax (which had funded the General Revenue Fund) and the Tangible Personal Property tax (which had funded local school districts directly). It replaced both with a smaller Commercial Activity Tax. The Ohio Office of Budget and Management estimated the change cost the state $3.26 billion in FY10 revenue, vs. only $1.3 billion replaced by the new CAT — a net loss of roughly $2 billion per year.
The TPP-side impact on schools is documented in §02 above. The corporate-franchise-side impact landed on the General Revenue Fund — i.e., the same fund the lottery is technically supplementing.
The CAT exclusion threshold — the gross-receipts amount below which a business owes no Commercial Activity Tax — was raised from $1 million to $3 million effective January 2024, and from $3 million to $6 million effective 2025, both enacted in HB 33. The change exempts tens of thousands of additional Ohio businesses from the CAT entirely.
The CAT was originally created in 2005 specifically to replace some of the revenue lost from the corporate franchise tax phase-out. Raising the exclusion threshold sixfold within a single biennial budget undoes a substantial portion of that replacement — re-eroding the GRF that the 2005 CAT was supposed to backstop.
Ohio offers data-center operators full or partial exemption from state sales tax on equipment purchases — a giveaway intended to attract Intel, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and Meta facilities. Per Signal Ohio's analysis of Ohio Department of Development data, data-center operators have claimed approximately $2.5 billion in state and local tax incentives between 2017 and 2024 (sales-tax exemption combined with JobsOhio credits and local property abatements).
The pipeline of announced Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and Meta data-center projects in Ohio represents billions of additional dollars in exemptions in coming years if all qualify. Amazon's December 2024 commitment to invest $10 billion more in Ohio data centers compounds the trajectory. None of that revenue feeds the General Revenue Fund.
The synthesis
Stack the two halves together: roughly $1.4 billion per year flows from Ohio Lottery players into the Lottery Profits Education Fund and is duly transferred to school districts. Approximately the same amount or more is simultaneously withheld from the General Revenue Fund through major business tax cuts — money that would otherwise have been available to fund public schools through the foundation formula. The net effect is the appearance of significant lottery-funded education spending alongside structurally underfunded public schools.
This is part of why a Sycamore levy in November 2026 is a local instrument the district has no choice but to use. The state has a billion-dollar lottery dedicated by constitutional amendment to schools, and an explicit court order to provide a "thorough and efficient system of common schools." Public schools still cannot keep their teachers without local voters voluntarily increasing local taxes — because the state structures surrounding the lottery, the General Revenue Fund, and the school-funding formula are designed to ensure no actual additional dollars reach the classrooms.
What is currently pending — five additional measures that would compress school revenue further
The 136th General Assembly convened in January 2025 and runs through 2026. Beyond the laws already signed, at least five major measures are currently active in the legislature or on a near-term path to enactment. None of them increases public-school funding. All of them either reduce it, redirect it to vouchers, restrict the local tools districts use to maintain it, or punish districts that defended themselves in court.
Item 66 of HB 96 would eliminate two of the levy types Ohio school districts have historically relied on as ballot tools: replacement levies and fixed-sum emergency and substitute levies. Removing these tools would constrain districts' ability to maintain operating revenue between major new ballot asks, particularly for districts that face HB 920's nominal-dollar freeze on regular operating millage.
Gov. DeWine line-item-vetoed Item 66 in June 2025. The House voted 61–28 to override on July 21, 2025. The Senate has until the end of 2026 to act on the override. The Ohio School Boards Association has identified the property-tax-related override items as top legislative concerns, warning they would shift substantial operating revenue away from school districts statewide.
(Separately, Item 65 — which would add emergency and substitute levies to the 20-mill-floor calculation — was also line-item-vetoed and remains a pending override target. As of this writing the House has not voted to override Item 65.)
SB 68 would create an entirely new voucher category — an Education Savings Account — for students attending Ohio's nonchartered nonpublic schools. The current EdChoice program covers chartered nonpublic schools (most Catholic and major private schools); SB 68 extends a parallel voucher to nonchartered schools, which are predominantly religious institutions outside the state's charter system.
The ESA amount would be up to 90% of the statewide per-pupil base — approximately $8,242 in FY25 dollars per student. The bill creates a sixth voucher program on top of the existing five, and specifically extends state subsidy to schools that have chosen to operate outside Ohio's basic regulatory framework.
HB 11 — colloquially the "Backpack Bill" — would create a universal Education Savings Account available to every K–12 student in Ohio, usable for private-school tuition, books, supplies, tutoring, and other educationally adjacent expenses. It is the most expansive voucher framework yet introduced in the General Assembly.
Speaker Matt Huffman has been an explicit, public champion of further voucher expansion, and has stated publicly that voucher programs save taxpayer money when implemented. Although HB 11 has not yet passed, the bill represents the announced direction of the Republican House caucus and is likely to be reintroduced in successive sessions until enacted.
HB 671, as initially introduced, would withhold state foundation funding from any of the 300+ Ohio school districts that joined the Vouchers Hurt Ohio coalition lawsuit challenging EdChoice. The state would hold the funds in escrow as a punitive response to districts asserting their constitutional position in court.
Public reaction from the public-school advocacy community was severe, with multiple organizations and legal observers raising concerns that the bill, if enacted, would itself face constitutional challenge as state retaliation against parties for exercising their right to seek judicial review. After backlash, Rep. Callender stated on February 17, 2026 that he would amend the bill so that the escrow would equal only the lawsuit-related spending of each plaintiff district. The amendment is pending; the underlying legislative impulse — that districts which sue the state should be financially punished — remains.
The AxOHTax amendment, if adopted, would eliminate the state's authority to levy any real property tax in Ohio. Statewide annual property-tax revenue is approximately $24 billion; public schools are by far the largest single recipient of that revenue. The amendment provides no replacement revenue mechanism.
As of April 23, 2026, organizers had collected approximately 305,000 of the 413,487 signatures required by July 1, 2026 to place the amendment on the November 2026 ballot. The current trajectory makes 2026 placement unlikely — but the campaign has stated explicit intent to refile for 2027 if the 2026 deadline is missed.
June 24, 2025 — a Franklin County court found EdChoice unconstitutional, on the same Article VI clause as DeRolph
Twenty-eight years after DeRolph I, an Ohio court has again held that the state's school-funding system violates Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution — this time specifically with respect to EdChoice vouchers. The lawsuit, the holding, and the appeal are the most consequential education-funding case in Ohio since DeRolph IV.
The case was filed in 2022 by a coalition of more than 100 Ohio school districts ("Vouchers Hurt Ohio"), and grew to include over 300 districts by the time of trial. The plaintiff coalition argued that EdChoice violates the Ohio Constitution on multiple grounds, including Article VI, Section 2's "thorough and efficient" clause and its prohibition on giving any "religious or other sect" exclusive control of school funds.
On June 24, 2025, Judge Jaiza Page issued a ruling holding that EdChoice violates the Ohio Constitution on multiple grounds — including Article VI, Section 2 (the same clause underlying DeRolph's "thorough and efficient" requirement) and Article VI's prohibition on sectarian control of school funds. The ruling was stayed pending appeal, so the program continues to operate. Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost appealed; the case is now pending in the 10th District Court of Appeals and is widely expected to be heard by the Ohio Supreme Court.
Sycamore Community Schools is not a member of the Vouchers Hurt Ohio coalition. Districts that have joined include Cincinnati Public, Forest Hills, Wyoming, and 300+ others across Ohio.
Read together, the record is not random policy choice. It is a direction.
Each of the laws above can be defended by its sponsors as a discrete response to a discrete problem: HB 920 was framed as taxpayer protection in 1976; the TPP phase-out was framed as economic-development policy; HB 33 was framed as parental choice; HB 96 was framed as fiscal discipline; the December 2025 property-tax bills were framed as inflation relief. Read individually, they are policy debates with at least two sides.
Read together, across the fifty-year arc, they form a coherent legislative trajectory: the state has incrementally reduced its support for public schools, opened ever-larger channels for the same dollars to flow to private institutions, and constrained the local revenue tools districts have to compensate. DeRolph told the General Assembly in 1997 that this trajectory was unconstitutional. Every action since has either ignored or compounded that ruling.
The leadership signals are not ambiguous.
Speaker Matt Huffman, the architect of much of the recent voucher and budget direction, has been publicly clear that voucher expansion is what he expects to continue.
And on the Vouchers Hurt Ohio coalition asserting their constitutional position in court — the position later upheld by Judge Page on multiple grounds — the response from Senate leadership was equally direct. After the June 2025 ruling, a spokesperson for Senate President Rob McColley publicly characterized the lawsuit as:
These are not slips, gaffes, or minority-faction positions. They are the announced direction of the people who set Ohio's school-funding policy. The legislative trajectory documented above is the trajectory they say it is.
What this means for local levies
The structural logic of where Ohio is now is direct: the state has progressively dismantled its share of public-school funding, leaving local property taxes and operating levies as the only remaining instrument by which districts can keep teachers in classrooms. Then, in December 2025, the same legislature began constraining the local instrument too. The space within which a school district like Sycamore can balance its books while protecting teachers and programs has narrowed in every successive legislative session for fifteen years.
A November 2026 levy in Sycamore is not just a vote on local revenue. It is a vote on whether a district that has spent fifteen years honoring its end of the bargain can continue to maintain its teaching staff while the state continues to legislate against its ability to do so.
What this means for the people who teach in Ohio public schools
Every dollar of compressed revenue eventually lands on a teacher. Step-and-base wage progression depends on a solvent General Fund. The 14% statutory STRS pension contribution depends on a solvent General Fund. Health and dental and vision insurance depend on a solvent General Fund. The classroom resources teachers buy with their own salaries depend on a solvent General Fund. The legislative record above is, ultimately, a record of what the State of Ohio has done to teacher compensation.
The teachers who built one of the highest-performing districts in Ohio did not author any of the policies on this page. They are paid out of the General Fund those policies have systematically compressed. Keeping them — paying them well, supporting them, retaining them — is the work of every levy a district like Sycamore puts on the ballot.
The State of Ohio has been told four times by its own Supreme Court that the way it funds public schools is illegal. It has spent thirty years widening the violation — and it isn't done. The November 2026 levy is what protects our teachers from the next chapter.
→ Read the case for yes